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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
JOHNSON TIRE SERVICE, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
For convenience, and because the defendant Thorn, 
Inc., has cross-appealed, the plaintiff, appellant, and 
cross-respondent Johnson Tire Service, Inc. will be 
designated throughout this brief as "Johnson"; and the 
defendant, respondent, cross-appellant Thorn, Inc. as 
"Thorn". 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Johnson against 
Thorn to collect $7,168.09 allegedly due Johnson from Thorn 
for purchases of tires and other goods. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court's disposition of this case is 
somewhat unusual. Both Johnson and Thorn filed Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The lower court initially granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Johnson in the amount of 
$7,168.09, together with interest at eighteen percent (18%) 
per annum from and after February 10, 1979. The lower court 
also entered an order denying Johnson's claim for attorneys 
fees; denied Thorn's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
issue of attorneys fees; and reserved for trial the issue 
of whether Thorn was contractually obligated to pay attorneys 
fees. Thereafter, counsel for Johnson stipulated that 
summary judgment could be entered against Johnson on the 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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issue of attorneys fees and judgment was entered accord-
ingly. (R. 31-36) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Johnson seeks reversal of the summary judgment 
denying Johnson's claim for attorneys fees. Thorn seeks 
affirmance of the summary judgment denying attorneys fees 
to Johnson; and, in a cross-appeal, seeks reversal of the 
lower court's entry of summary judgment finding as a matter 
of law that Thorn was obligated to pay interest at eighteen 
percent (18%) per annum on the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Thorn does not materially dispute the statement 
of facts contained in Johnson's brief, with the exception 
of certain statements made in Paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 16 
thereof, which Thorn deems either to be inconsistent with 
the actual facts or self-serving conclusions. Thorn also 
deems the following facts, not stated in Johnson's brief, 
to be material: 
On or about May 17, 1978, Thorn, Inc., through its 
agent Reece Allan, ordered four (4) tires from Johnson. 
The contract between the parties is evidenced by a "purchase 
order" number 34682, a copy of which appears in the Appendix 
to this brief as an exhibit. The purchase order contains no 
provision for the payment of interest at 18%, costs or 
attorneys fees. When the tires were delivered to Thorn 
-2-
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the delivery slip contained "fine print" at the bottom 
stating, among other things, that if payment were not made 
in thirty days from the date thereon, the buyer agreed to 
pay interest at 18%, costs of collection, and reasonable 
attorneys fees. (R. 4) The delivery slip was not signed 
by an officer, director, or other person in authority of 
Thorn, Inc.; nor were the provisions relating to interest, 
costs, and attorneys fees discussed with any corporate 
officer before the tires were delivered. (R. 21) The 
affidavit of Dennis D. Weir, Executive Vice-President of 
Thorn, states that "while Affiant admits that Thorn, Inc., 
ordered tires from Plaintiff on open account, the extent of 
the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant was that 
Defendant would pay a quoted price for the tires but not 
interest at 18%, costs, or attorney's fees." (Although 
designated, Mr. Weir's affidavit is not found in the record 
on appeal; but a copy of the affidavit appears in the Appen-
dix hereto as an exhibit.) Furthermore, the affidavits of 
Ed and Mike Johnson state that Jerry Thorn, President of 
Thorn, Inc., " ••• also objected to the 18% interest rate 
being charged by us (Johnson)." (R. 18, 19) 
On June 12, 1979, the Honorable David Sam issued 
a ruling, a copy of which appears in the Appendix hereto, 
which states in part: 
"Defendants (sic) motion for summary judgment 
is denied it appearing to the Court that there 
is an issue in dispute as to whether the 
-3-
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customers (sic) signature blank which was 
signed by Byron Hobbs binds the Defendant 
for payment of attorneys fees. Plaintiff 
is awarded partial summary judgment in the 
sum of $7,168.09 which includes interest at 
the rate of 1.5% per month to and including 
February 10, 1979. The Court awards interest 
at the same rate until judgment is paid in 
full. The Court is of the opinion that the 
Defendant has established a course of conduct 
with Plaintiffs (sic) credit terms which 
binds the Defendant to the same with respect 
to the monthly service charge of 1.5% per month 
on all unpaid balances due Plaintiff. The 
Court finds that such course of conduct was 
not established with respect to the attorneys 
fee claimed by the Plaintiff. Accordingly, 
said issue is reserved for trial and will be 
placed on the trial calendar for setting upon 
notice of readiness for trial being filed." 
Thereafter, Johnson and Thorn, through their counsel, 
entered into a stipulation to the effect that Byron Hobbs, 
the employee of Thorn and who acknowledged receipt of the 
Michelin tires, was not an agent of Thorn; that ". the 
additional terms of credit in such invoice as relating to 
interest and attorneys fees are not binding on the Defendant 
where they are not signed by an authorized agent of the 
Defendant; that §70A-2-207 of the Utah Uniform CollUllercial 
Code does not extend to attorneys fees without a specific 
signed writing or other evidence of consent; and that Defen-
dant is entitled to partial summary judgment denying Plaintiff's 
claim for attorneys fees." (R. 35, 36) Thus, e·ven though 
the lower court found initially that there remained an issue 
of material fact with respect to whether the signature of 
Byron Hobbs bound Thorn for payment of attorneys fees, rather 
-4-
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than try that issue, Johnson's counsel stipulated to the 
entry of summary judgment in favor of Thorn on the issue of 
attorneys fees. 
ARGUMENT 
romT r 
PROCEDURALLY, JOHNSON CANNOT STIPULATE TO THE ENTRY OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT THEN SEEK ON APPEAL TO REVERSE THE ENTRY 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
From a procedural standpoint, Johnson's appeal is 
defective as a matter of law and subject to dismissal on 
motion. It is undisputed that the lower court determined 
that there remained an issue of material fact with respect to 
whether the signature of Byron Hobbs bound Thorn for payment 
of attorneys fees. While Thorn does not necessarily agree 
with the Court's initial finding, it is clear that neither 
party may appeal from the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment. For that reason, counsel for Johnson decided, 
fatally, to stipulate that the trial court was incorrect in 
holding that there remained an issue of material fact with 
respect to the award of attorneys fees and that the Court 
could enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of Thorn on 
that issue. Now Johnson seeks in this appeal to reverse 
the stipulated entry of summary judgment. Thorn respectfully 
submits that procedurally, Johnson cannot stipulate to the 
entry of summary judgment on an issue which the Court 
initially found to be an issue of material fact then seek 
on appeal to reverse the entry of SUil'mary judgment. 
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POINT II 
ATTORNEYS FEES ARE NOT A PROPER ELEMENT OF "SELLERS INCI-
DENTAL DAMAGES" UNDER §70A-2-710 OF THE UTAH UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE. 
In 2 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code, §§2-710:3 
and 2-710:4, the following statements are found: 
"It is also to be noted that Section 2-710 
relates only to incidental damages. It does 
not extend the consequential damages, and, 
accordingly, the recoverability of such damages, 
if recoverable at all, is governed by the 
principles of prior lawl. 11 Footnote 1 states: 
"It is to be noted that attorney's fees may not 
be recovered as consequential damages. 
Quattlebaum v. Schutt, 27 AGRIC DEPT 242." 
2 Anderson Uniform Commercial Code, Sales, 
§§2-710:3 and 2-710:4 at page 407. 
In Florida National Bank vs. Alfred and Ann 
Goldstein Foundation, Inc., 327 So.2d 110 (Fla. 1976), the 
Court stated: 
"The· ·right to recover attorneys' fees as part 
of costs did not exist at common law. (Dodorno 
v. Emanual, Sup. Ct. Fla. 1953, 91 So.2d 653) 
Attorneys' fees may not be taxed as costs unless 
provided for by statute or contract. (Shavers 
v. Duval County, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1953, 63 So.2d 
684) The award for attorneys' fees being in 
derogation of the common law, any statute pro-
viding for an award thereof must be strictly 
construed. (Great American Indemnity Company 
v. Williams, Sup.Ct.Fla. 1953, 85 So.2d 619~ 
Gullette v. Ochoa, Fla.App.1st, 1953, 194 
So.2d 799) However, in appropriate cases 
attorneys' fees may constitute an element of 
recoverable damages. (Glusman v. Lieberman, 
Fla.App.4th, 1973, 285 So.2d 29, and cases 
therein cited.) 
Construing F.S. 675.115 and F.S. 672.710 in 
the light of the facts of this case and in the 
light of F.S. 671.103 and F.S. 671.106(1) ~ 
hold that those statutes were not intended to 
-6-
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afford a vehicle for the award of attorneys' 
fees either as costs nor as "commercially 
reasonable char es, ex enses or connnissions." 
See Neri v. Retail Marine Corporation, 30 
N.Y.2d 393, 334, N.Y.S.2d 165, 285 N.E.2d 
311)." (Emphasis added) 
In Bossier Bank & Trust Company vs. Union Planters 
National Bank of Memphis, 550 F.2d 1077 (6th Cir. 1977), 
the Court construed §2-710 of the Tennessee Uniform Commer-
cial Code as not authorizing a break with the traditional 
American rule concerning the award of attorneys fees with 
damages. The Court stated: 
"T.C.A. 47-5-115 says that when an issuer 
wrongfully dishonors a letter of credit the 
beneficiary may recover "the face amount of 
the draft or demand together with incidental 
damages under § 47-2-710 on seller's inciden-
tal damages and interest but less than any 
amount realized by resale or other use or 
disposition of the subject matter of the 
transaction". T.C.A. 47-2-710 provides the 
following: 
Sellers incidental damages. --Incidental 
damages to an aggrieved seller include any 
commercially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions incurred in stopping delivery, 
in the transportation, care and custody of 
goods after the buyer's breach, in connection 
with return or resale of the goods or other-
wise resulting from the breach. (sic) 
The official comment to 47-2-710 says this: 
Purposes: To authorize reimbursement of the 
seller for expenses reasonably incurred by 
him as a result of the buyer's breach. The 
section sets forth the principal normal and 
necessary additional elements of damage flow-
ing from the breach but intends to allow all 
commercial reasonable expenditures made by 
the seller. (sic) 
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Nowhere in either of these statutes are 
attorneys' fees specifically mentioned. I 
cannot read T.C.A. 47-2-710 as authorizing a 
break with the traditional American rule con-
cerning the award of attorneys' fees as damages. 
Had the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code 
intended attorneys' fees to be included as 
incidental damages, they could easily have 
mentioned them--and no doubt would have, since 
the exclusion of attorneys' fees is such a 
well known exception to the general rule of 
damages. 
In Point 1 of its brief and the argument thereunder, 
Johnson asserts that notwithstanding the language found in 
Spanish Fork Packing Company vs. House of Fine Meats, Inc., 
29 Utah 2d 312, 508 P.2d 1186 (1973), and having stipulated 
that Byron Hobbs ". was found not to be an agent of the 
Defendant (Thorn) .•• " (R. 35), this Court should construe 
§§70A-2-207 and 70A-2-710 of the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code as authorizing the award of attorneys fees under the 
facts of the instant case. In the Spanish Fork Packing case, 
supra, plaintiff sued defendant to recover an amount owed on 
an open account for the purchase of meat and meat products. 
Plaintiff asserted in its pleadings that the purchases were 
evidenced by seven invoices attached to the complaint; that 
the invoices provided that plaintiff was entitled to a 
reasonable attorneys fee, and that a reasonable fee was 
$1,070.50. The trial court granted plaintiff partial summary 
judgment for the amount defendant conceded that it owed on 
the open account. The issue of whether defendant was con-
tractually obligated to pay attorneys fees was reserved for 
-8-
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trial. Upon trial before the Court, judgment was rendered 
decreeing that plaintiff's claim for attorneys fees was 
denied. Plaintiff appealed from the order denying attorneys 
fees. 
In affirming the trial court, this Court, citing 
the case of B & R Supply Company vs. Bringhurst, stated: 
" •• , The creation of a contract requires 
a meeting of the minds of the parties; and 
the burden of so proving is upon the party 
who claims there was a contract. This 
Court observed (in the B & R Supply Company 
case) that the evidence indicated that the 
defendant had never authorized any of the 
persons who signed the invoices to contract 
on its behalf other than as an open account. 
This Court stated: 
There is no affirmative showing 
to the contrary, nor that any 
contractual terms or conditions 
on the invoice were called to 
their attention, nor that they 
were aware of them, nor that 
they did anythinq other than to 
initial the invoices acknowledging 
the receipt of the merchandise. 
Under those circumstances we can 
see no basis for a conclusion that 
the defendant entered a contract 
to pay attorney's fees. 
This court further observed in footnote 4 at 
page 1218 of 503 P.2d that if one ordered 
merchandise, which was agreed to be delivered 
for a requested price, that would be the 
extent of both the contract and the pur-
chaser's obligation. If upon receipt of 
the merchandise, the invoice or delivery 
slip, the purchaser signed, purported to 
impose further conditions or covenants, a 
serious question would arise as to the 
question of whether there was any considera-
tion for such further obligation. 
508 P.2d at 1187, 1188, citing 
B & R Supply Company vs. 
Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 
503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (1972) · 
-9-
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Analyzing the facts of the instant case in light 
of the applicable law, the agreement between Thorn and 
Johnson was for the purchase of tires for a specified amount. 
When the tires were delivered to Thorn, additional terms and 
conditions were imposed, including the payment of interest 
at 18% per annum and attorneys fees. The fact that an agent 
of Thorn, Inc., may have acknowledged receipt of the tires 
does not, under the cases cited above, create a binding 
obligation on behalf of the buyer to pay interest at 18% per 
annum or attorneys fees. Johnson, by having stipulated that 
Byron Hobbs could not bind Thorn to pay attorneys fees, 
cannot now claim a meeting of the minds on that issue or 
that §70A-2-207 should be construed to require Thorn to pay 
attorneys fees. Johnson cites no case authority under Point 
1 of its brief specifically construing §70A-2-207 of the 
Uniform Conunercial Code as requiring the purchaser of goods 
to pay attorneys fees. Research by Thorn's counsel revealed 
no such case authority. 
Thorn, therefore, respectfully submits that the 
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the 
Bossier case, supra, is sound: 
"Had the drafters of the Uniform Corr.mercial 
Code intended attorneys' fees to be included 
as incidental damages, they could have 
easily mentioned them--and no doubt would 
have, since the exclusion of attorneys' fees 
is such a well known exception to the 
general rule of damages." 550 F.2d at 1083. 
-10-
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POINT III 
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
JOHNSON WAS ENTITLED TO INTEREST AT 18% PER ANNUM. 
The affidavits in support of both Johnson's and 
Thorn's Motions for Summary Judgment clearly raise an issue 
of disputed material fact with respect to whether there was 
an agreement between Johnson and Thorn that Thorn would be 
liable for interest at 18% per annum on any overdue balance 
with Johnson. The affidavit of Dennis D. Weir in support 
of Thorn's Motion for Summary Judgment, a copy of which 
(except for signatures and notarization) appears in the 
Appendix section of this brief, states: 
"While affiant (Dennis D. Weir, Executive 
Vice-President of Thorn) admits that Thorn, 
Inc., ordered tires from Plaintiff on open 
account, the extent of the contract between 
Plaintiff and Defendant was that Defendant 
would pay a quoted price for the tires but 
not interest at 18%, costs, or attorneys 
fees." 
The affidavits of Ed and Mike Johnson (R. 18, 19) 
further state that Jerry Thorn, President of Thorn, Inc., 
• • also objected to the 18% interest rate being charged 
by us (Johnson)." 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
could not, without an evidentiary hearing, conclude as a 
matter of fact or law "that the defendant's course of conduct 
in dealings with the plaintiff established a contractual 
agreement binding the defendant to pay a monthly financing 
or service charge (i.e., "interest") of 1.5% per month 
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where the defendant was regularly sent a monthly statement 
of its account showing charges for interest and principal, 
where payments made by the defendant were consistently 
applied first to current interest and then to principal, and 
where said interest, when unpaid, was consistently added to 
principal." (R. 35) 
CONCLUSION 
Thorn respectfully submits that the legal argument 
set forth in Johnson's brief is inconsistent with the con-
clusion reached in every reported opinion wherein the issue 
of whether attorneys fees are includable as "seller's 
incidental damages" under §70A-2-710 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code was raised. Thorn further submits that the trial court, 
without an evidentiary hearing, erred in deciding as a matter 
of law that there was a course of dealing between Johnson and 
Thorn which required Thorn to pay interest at 18% per annum 
on delinquent unpaid amounts owed to Johnson. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEWART, YOUNG, PAXTON & RUSSELL 
By~l\~ 
Steven H. Stewart 
Attorneys for Respondent and 
Cross-Appellant 
220 South 200 East, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
531-7670 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant were served upon 
the Appellant by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to 
Layne T. Rushforth, Attorney for Appellant, 1325 South 800 
East, Suite 300, Orem, Utah 84057, this 31st day of 
January, 1980. 
~l~ 
Steven H. Stewart 
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S'l'EVBN R. SHWART 
STEWART, YOONG, PAXTON ' ROSSELL 
Attorneys for Defendant 
220 South Second East, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
'l'elephone: 531-7670 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRXCT COURT OP UTAH COUN'l'Y, 
STATB OF tJ'l'AB 
* • • • • • • 
JOHNSON TIRB SERVICE, INC., • 
a Utah corporation, 
• Al'FIDAVXT 
Plaintiff, 
• 
vs. 
• Civil Ho. 50946 TRORH, J;NC., 
a Ut:ah corporation, • 
Defendant. • 
BTATB OF UTAH ) 
• • •• COO!l'.l'r OP UTAH ) 
-
DENNIS D. WEIR, being first duly sworn upon oath, ~ 
and aayss 
1. Affiant is Executive Vice President of the deftnl 
'l'horn, Inc., a Utah corporation1 ia competent to teatify to t11 
111&ttera stated herein1 and i• duly authorized to i:iake t.hi• 
affidavit on behalf of the defendant. corporation. 
2. Affiant admit.a that 'l'horn, Inc. owe• to plaint!!: 
the principal •um of $6,096.65. 
J. Affiant. never diacuas~d with any repreaentati~ 1 
plaintiff the D1attera of payment of counsel fees, interest, or 
the time in which plaintiff expected the bill to be paid. 
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( 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me t:hie _ day of 
March, 1979. 
ROTARY PUBLIC 
Rel!lidinq at 
~~~~~~~~~~-
~ CoJlllllJ.seion Expires: 
CER'l'IFICA'l'E OP SBRVICB 
I hereby certify that a copy of the forec;oin9 waa 
served upon the plaintiff by inailin9 the same, poata9e prepaU, 
to Layne '1'. Rushforth, Attorney for Plaintiff, 930 Sout:b Stab 
su--t, Suite 10, or-, Utah 84057, t:hi• _day of Maro!l, 
1979. 
Steven B. Stewart 
J 
1 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
) 
JOHNSON TIRE SERVICE, INC. ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs ) R U L I N 
THORN, INC. ) 
) 41 50. 946 Defendant, 
) 
) 
G 
This matter is before the court on Motions filed by both 
the plaintiff and defendant for Summary Judgment and is conside 
pursuant to Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice of the District 
Courts. 
R U L I N G 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment is denied it appe 
ing to the court that there is an issue in dispute as to wheth 
the customers signature blank which was signed by Byron Hobbs 
binds the defendant for payment of attorneys fees. Plaintiffi 
awarded partial Summary Judgment in the sum of $7,168.09 which 
includes interest at the rate of 1~% per month to and including 
February 10, 1979. The court awards interest at the same rate 
until said judgment is paid 'in full. The court is of the opini 
that the defendant has established a course of conduct with the 
plaintiffs credit terms which binds the defendant to the same 
with respect to the monthly service charge of 1~% per month on 
all unpaid balances due the plaintiff. The court finds that s 
course of conduct was not established with respect to the atto 
fee claimed by the plaintiff. Accordingly, said issue is rese 
for trial and will be placed on the trial calendar for setting 
upon a notice of readiness for trial being filed. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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